In the past decade there have been important changes in the design and conduct of monetary policy around the world. Movements in global capital during the late 1990s and the greater emphasis on price stability forced many countries to abandon fixed exchange rate regimes and to design institutions and monetary policies to achieve credibility in the goal of lowering inflation. Such recent deve lopments have brought to the forefront the idea that freely mobile capital, independent monetary policy, and fixed exchange rates form an "impossible trinity." It is possible to have two of these policies, but not all three.
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, significant changes in the design and conduct of monetary policy have occurred around the world. Many developed and developing countries have adopted inflation-targeting regimes, and 11 European countries formed the European Monetary Union in 1999. These events and the need for providing guidelines for appropriate institutional design have been a crucial impetus in the current interest in monetary policy issues in academic research and policymaking circles. This paper is organized as follows. After discussing the general role of monetary policy, in particular its objectives, targets, and instruments, it will then address two particular issuesdynamic inconsistency and rules versus discretion-that are relevant because many countries have weak institutions and poor credibility of their monetary policy actions. After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods arrangement in the early 1970s, countries have operated under several types of monetary-exchange rate frameworks. Choosing a framework is by necessity country specific as it depends on the country's inflationary history, its degree of financial development, and its institutions and social conventions. The paper will analyze one monetary policy regime that has been adopted by several countries since the late 1990s, namely inflation targeting. The paper will touch on the country experiences so far with this regime, and on the preconditions necessary for the success of inflation targeting, particularly in developing countries.
THE ROLE OF MONETARY POLICY: INSTRUMENTS, TARGETS, AND OBJECTIVES
Monetary policy objectives have traditionally included promoting growth, achieving full employment, smoothing the business cycle, preventing financial crises, and stabilizing longterm interest rates and the real exchange rate. Although some objectives are consistent with each other, others are not; for example, the objective of price stability often conflicts with the objectives of interest rate stability and high short-run employment. Countries may assign these objectives equal weights or, as many countries have done in recent years, place greater emphasis on the objective of low inflation. This recent shift has been triggered by strong empirical evidence that high inflation (and its associated high variability) distorts the decision-making of private agents with regards to investment, savings, and production, and ultimately leads to slower economic growth. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) show that if one considers the impact of monetary policy on the ability of the banking system to lend, credit succeeds as an intermediate variable where monetary aggregates fail, specifically, when demand for money is unstable, as is the case when a country is undergoing a process of financial development. Thus, in these circumstances policymakers may get a clearer picture of inflation or longer-term economic growth by observing credit rather than monetary aggregates.
Second, identifying the credit channel of monetary transmission has permitted a greater understanding of the nature and characteristics of business cycles. As a series of studies following Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) during the late 1990s shows, the impact of monetary policy and other shocks to the macroeconomy tends to be stronger and more persistent than traditional models would predict, and the credit channel helps to explain this discrepancy. The credit channel contains an amplifying mechanism whereby difficulties in the real sector lead to tightness in credit markets, thus shrinking the credit available for investment, which in turn exacerbates the real sector's downturn. Furthermore, it is now apparent that shocks to bank credit itself may have a considerable impact on economic activity. Indeed, studies of recent slowdowns in bank credit in different regions of the world show that regulatory changes as well as past financial distress may lead banks to adopt a more cautious approach to lending, with a visible impact on economic activity.
DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY AND INFLATIONARY BIAS
While both theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated the fallacy of a long-run relationship between wage inflation and unemployment, under certain circumstances a shortrun trade-off between these variables may be found. The existence of this short-run Phillips curve is widely believed to be associated with the presence of sticky wages and prices. The possibility that an expansionary monetary policy may increase output and employment in the short run leads to one aspect of what has been termed the "problem of dynamic inconsistency," developed principally by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978) .
Dynamic inconsistency refers to the difference between the optimal policies that a central bank would announce if they were considered credible by the public, and the policies that the central bank would carry out after the public had made decisions on the basis of its expectations. If the central bank announces that it will target a particular rate of inflation, and the public engages in contracts based on that announcement, the central bank will have an incentive to renege on its promise, by exploiting the possibility of achieving higher output by producing surprise inflation. But the public will then know this, and will adjust its inflationary expectations upward, thereby limiting the desired output gain. In fact, output may not rise at all, depending on whether underlying wage and price rigidities prevent complete wage and price adjustments. Another way of putting this idea is to say that policymakers unconstrained by rules have an incentive to "cheat" the private sector in order to spur an output gain. However, since rational agents account for the incentive of policymakers to produce surprise inflation, they will adjust their behavior accordingly, creating an econo my with an inflationary bias.
The government's incentive to inflate might result from other considerations than unemployment. For instance, it might result from budgetary considerations. If the government finances part of its expenditures with revenues from money creation or a reduction in the real value of its liabilities, it has an incentive to announce a low rate inflation, inducing high demand for real balances, and then to choose a higher rate of inflation later on. Knowing the government's incentive to inflate, the public and investors distrust the government, minimize their cash balances, and purchase only indexed debt.
Dynamic inconsistency can also imply difficulties in bringing down inflation in disinflation plans. After the private sector sets nominal contracts, the government tries to disinflate less than promised to obtain some output growth. The government announces a low inflation rate and expects the public to believe it. However, the announcement of low inflation by the government is not credible. The public knows that the government has an incentive to renege its promises after the public sets its expectations, and therefore does not believe in the disinflation announcement.
A number of countries have successfully resorted to pegging the exchange rate in order to overcome the dynamic inconsistency problem, but it must be emphasized that this mechanism is also not exempted completely from a similar dynamic inconsistency problem.
By pegging the exchange rate, the government wants to reduce inflation by importing credibility from abroad, i. e., from a lower inflation country. However, the public knows that the government has an incentive to renege its promises and devalue the currency to depreciate the real exchange rate and stimulate exports and the domestic output. The public will therefore not believe in the disinflation plan and inflation will not decrease as much as the government would like after the introduction of the pegged exchange rate system.
One could therefore ask the following question: Are countries condemned to an equilibrium with high inflation rates, where the public distrust the government because of its incentive to renege? Of course, there are institutional reforms that countries can adopt to lower inflationary expectations and still keep some flexibility to counteract shocks in the economy.
The paper will outline the debate on rules versus discretion in the next section and the current discussions on inflation targeting in the following sections as a mechanism device to overcome the inflationary bias in monetary policy.
RULES VERSUS DISCRETION
Many now agree that central banks cannot act in a completely discretionary manner. Some kind of guideline or "rule" is essential for good policy, and acting without a rule may ha ve adverse consequences. This consensus emerges from a long debate amongst economists regarding the relative merits of rules versus discretion in the conduct of monetary policy.
However, there is still disagreement on whether rules and discretion are mutually exclusive.
At a narrow extreme, a rule may be thought of as a pre-set policy, independent of contemporaneous circumstances, neither permitting nor requiring judgment or discretion over
time. An example of such a policy might be Milton Friedman's (1960) proposal for constant money growth. Any deviation from a rule like this is, by definition, discretionary policy. At the other extreme, some like Ralph Bryant and others (1993) provide perhaps the broadest interpretation of a rule: they suggest that all monetary regimes can be described as a system of rules-even ones with discretionary elements.
However, the distinction between rules and discretion that most use probably lies between these two extremes. (2000) and John Taylor (1993) , have suggested that, to be rules-based, a monetary regime must satisfy certain minimum criteria. It is not sufficient for policy be nonrandom. Even under a discretionary regime, the central bank has policy goals and does not conduct policy randomly. However, under a discretionary regime, while policymakers may have an objective function, they nonetheless operate on a period-by-period basis.
Decisions are based on current conditions while past experiences are treated as irrelevant bygones. By contrast, for a regime to consist of rules, policymakers must have a longer-run -11 -Traditionally, economists have focused on two main kinds of instrument rules:
?? Money growth rules (advocated by McCallum) are extensions of Friedman's proposal but have been extended to include feedback elements as a way to correct past mistakes or to gradually adjust to permanent shifts in velocity.
?? Interest rate rules (advocated by Taylor (1993) ) also include feedback elements: the central bank raises interest rates when expected inflation rises but also reduces interest rates when unemployment rises above an undesirable level.
Which of these target rules should be more successful in restraining inflation, preventing unnecessary business cycle fluctuations, or encouraging growth over the long term remains an unsettled question. More recently, economists have come to agree that rules may apply to targets as well as instruments. Examples of target rules include both exchange rate management regimes and especially the inflation targeting regimes that will be discussed later.
Finally, most now agree that any rules-based regimes still permit a margin for discretion.
Some, like Ben Bernanke, now at the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, have come to reject the idea that rules and discretion are diametrically opposed. Instead, "rules" and "discretion" may be complements. The more well defined the rule, the more effectively and more judiciously can discretionary policy be applied when needed.
THE NEED FOR A NOMINAL ANCHOR: EVOLUTION OF MONETARY FRAMEWORKS
As policymakers in many countries throughout the world have gravitated toward an approach based more on rules than on full discretion, the issue of choosing an appropriate target for policy has become key. In a rules-based policy, the target serves as a communication tool
with the public, as it reveals policymakers' intentions and priorities, and indicates whether a policy action-for example, a change in the short-term interest rate, or an intervention in the foreign exchange market-will be required. In turn, to the extent that the public observes and understands this target, it establishes a "nominal anchor" for agents' expectations, thus helping to achieve and maintain price stabilization.
Nominal anchors can either be price-or quantity-based. The list of possible price anchors is relatively extensive, encompassing the exchange rate, the price of gold, the composite price of a basket of relevant commodities for a country, and, finally, the inflation rate. On the other hand, discussion of quantity anchors tends to focus on two major candidates: monetary aggregates and to a lesser extent, nominal income. Effectiveness of the anchor chosen will rely, among other things, on renouncing all other anchors. For example, policymakers cannot credibly adopt one price anchor, such as the exchange rate, and commit to maintaining another price or quantity anchor. announce a move to greater exchange flexibility yet continue to intervene actively in the foreign exchange market, appears to be a common feature in many developing countries. Calvo and Reinhart (2000, 2002) have examined this phenomenon closely, labeling it "fear of floating," and have argued that it is a natural response to the unique conditions facing emerging economies today. They show that a typical developing country with a floating exchange rate tends to intervene far more aggressively than industrial countries, allowing less variability in the exchange rate and much greater variability in interest rates. There is good reason for this, they argue, as the developing country is justifiably wary of the costly effects of large depreciations-loss of access to international capital markets, a high pass-through from exchange rates to inflation, detrimental impact on trade, and loss of policy credibilityand equally concerned with the Dutch disease-type consequences of real appreciations.
Thus, developing countries recently have either opted for hard pegs-for example currency boards or outright adoption of another country's currency-or for more flexible regimes, albeit with a significant degree of interve ntion and smoothing of exchange rate fluctuations.
Choosing a hard peg, or an exchange rate anchor, may have certain advantages: it is relatively easy to implement, provides a readily understood and transparent target for policymakers, and, by leading to greater exchange rate stability, may encourage trade and foreign investment. Furthermore, in contrast to intermediate regimes, it has been shown in a recent study by Frankel, Schmukler, and Servén (2000) that, because of its simplicity, a hard peg is more verifiable by market participants, that is, it is easier for agents to assess whether the target is being achieved ex post. In this manner, a hard peg may permit a more rapid convergence of agents' expectations to the desired long-run level targeted by policymakers.
For these reasons, experience has shown that adoption of hard pegs has in many instances been successful in stabilizing inflation from historically high levels.
However, other factors weigh in favor of adopting monetary over exchange rate targets.
Freeing up the exchange rate allows a country the option of pursuing an independent monetary policy, which may then be used countercyclically to minimize fluctuations in real activity. By retaining monetary independence, a country also retains seigniorage revenue as well as a lender-of-last-resort function by which the central bank may be able to provide emergency support to solvent but illiquid banks. A more flexible exchange rate could act as an automatic stabilizer in the event of adverse trade shocks, for example by providing stimulus to demand for nontradables when the market for a country's exports has been hit with a negative shock. Finally, the experience in recent years has shown that fixed exchange rates tend to be particularly vulnerable to speculative attacks, and thus currency crises are more likely whe n a government commits to a pre-announced level for the exchange rate. On the same line of thought, unemployment (real output) stabilization may be given some cons ideration within an inflation targeting regime, but only as a secondary goal of monetary policy. In a "strict inflation targeting" regime the monetary policy instrument may respond to the output gap, but only to the extent that it affects the inflation forecast, and not because it enters in the central bank's loss function. In this case, the authorities should be aware that the larger the weight given to unemployment stabilization, the longer it will take to achieve the inflation target, following a shock that affects the output gap. 
b. Country Experiences
Although there is some disagreement on the criteria used to classify a country as a full- It is important to keep in mind that the inflation targeting strategy is not a panacea. It is a useful framework for conducting monetary policy because of the transparency it provides on the link between monetary policy actions and the pursuit of the inflation target. In addition, it provides a framework for conducting monetary policy under constrained discretion. It relies on rules, as the adoption of explicit targets requires commitment by the central bank toward policy consistency. At the same time, it leaves at the central bank 's discretion the decision as how to deploy its instruments, which allows for some flexibility in responding to unforeseen domestic and external shocks. But maintaining sound macroeconomic fundamentals remains the necessary condition for preserving price stability under any monetary framework.
CONCLUSION
In developing countries, monetary policy has become increasingly important in recent years, even though capital accounts have been progressively liberalized. The reason is that the large movements in global capital during the late 1990s forced many of these countries to abandon fixed or closely managed exchange rate regimes. Such recent developments have put a new face on an older, deeper lesson: namely that freely mobile capital, independent monetary policy, and fixed exchange rates form an "impossible trinity." It is possible to have any two of these policies, but not all three.
In a globalized capital markets environment, there is less room for divergence of views among market participants about the appropriate stance of exchange rate and monetary policy, less time to adjust to shocks, and greater pressure to achieve closer convergence of economic performance among trading partners. As a result, a number of developing countries have adopted or are seriously considering to adopt regimes with more exchange rate flexibility-and greater scope for monetary policy.
-25 -Traditionally, monetary rules have been based on the behavior of monetary instruments.
However, in an environment of large international capital flows with unceasing financial innovation and ever more sophisticated asset markets, instrument-based rules-in particular, those based on monetary aggregates-have become more difficult to implement.
Accordingly, central banks have increasingly embraced the inflation targeting approach. In some cases, the approach has helped monetary policy become more coherent, transparent, and credible. And, if supported by proper fiscal measures, the inflation targeting approach has helped policymakers smoothly guide inflation rates ever lower, while permitting some discretion to stabilize output. This regime has become increasingly popular and so far the results have been promising.
